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NOTES
Under the common law, the courts have sanctioned the rights of more than
one person to use the same mark where they have become so entitled through concurrent lawful use. 40 However, under the Act of 1905 registration was denied
except to the first user. The New Act allows concurrent registration of the same
or similar marks to more than one registrant where they have become entitled to
use such marks as a result of the concurrent lawful use.41
The Act of 1905 required that a trademark be affixed to the article itself.4 2
Under the New Act physcial affixation is not required. The use of the mark on
displays associated with the goods is sufficient to create rights3 Thus service
marks, advertising slogans, collective marks, certification marks, etc., will come
within the Act.
The New Act should go a long way toward clarifying the law by bringing
the law of unfair competition and trademark infringement together on the same
common ground. It is expressly stated that one of the purposes is to protect
persons engaged in "commerce" against unfair competition, commerce being defined as "all commerce which may be lawfully regulated by Congress." 44 A mark
used wholly within the borders of one particular state cannot be registered under
the Act and must therefore be protected by the law of that State. However the
Erie v. Tompkins4 5 doctrine would not apply where a local product was infringing lupon a product in interstate commerce. 46
J. RICHARD PLUMB.

VALIDITY OF CONTRACTS NOT To COMPETE
Recently, the Wyoming Supreme Court considered the question of the
validity of an employment contract in which the employee, a mechanic, agreed
not to compete with his employer within the counties of Sheridan, Johnson, and
Campbell, for a period of seven years after termination of the contract.1 The
court held that the contract was invalid since the primary purpose of the contract
was to prevent the employee from quitting present employment, and not for the
purpose of protecting employers trade secrets, and further, that the time and territorial restrictions of the covenant were unreasonable.
This is a case of first impression in Wyoming, 2 and the decision places the
law in this state relative to such covenants in accord with the general law on the
matter in other states.
40.

Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U. S. 403, 36 Sup. Ct. 357, 60 L. Ed. 713

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

60 Stat. 428, 15 U. S. C. A. Sec. 1052 (Supp. 1946).
33 Stat. 724 (1905), as amended, 15 U. S. C. A. 81.
60 Stat. 429, 15 U. S. C. A. 1053, 1054 (Supp. 1946).
60 Stat. 443, 15 U. S. C. A. 1127 (Supp. 1946).
304 U. S. 64, 58 Sup. Ct. 817, 82 L. Ed. 1188, 114 A. L. R. 1487 (1938).

(1916).

46. Texas and Pacific Ry. v. Abeline Cotton Oil Co., 204 U. S. 426, 27 Sup. Ct. 350, 51
L. Ed. 553 (1907) ; Postal Telegraph-Cable Co. v. Warren-Godwin Lumber Co., 251
U. S. 27, 40 Sup. Ct. 69, 64 L. Ed. 118 (1919).
1.
2.

Ridley v. Krout, 180 P. (2d) 124 (Wyo. 1947).
The court recognized the difference between the instant case and Dutch Maid Bakeries v. Schleicher, 58 Wyo. 374, 131 P. (2d) 630 (1941).
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In the instant case, the Court cited with approval the dicta, "A man's right
to labor in any occupation in which he is fit to engage is a valuable right, which
should not be taken from him or limited, by injunction, except in a clear case
3
showing the justice and necessity therefor," thus indicating that under proper
condiions the contract might have been enforced had certain elements been present which would have shown the "justice and necessity" of the subject contract.
The question of validity of such contracts, then, will turn on the presence of such
elements as will make the contract justifiable.
In early Common Law, unlimited covenants of an employee ancillary to an
employment contract in which the employee agreed not to exercise the trade of
the employer in direct competition with the employer, or in the employ of another
in competition with the employer, were held uniformly invalid, apparently on the
basis of public policy and a desire to stimulate and encourage trade.4
Until the early part of the twentieth century, few courts made any distinctions between covenants not to compete which were ancillary to contracts of
employment, ancillary to the sale of a business, or ancillary to the dissolution of
a partnership. Failure of the courts to distinguish between such covenants led to
a fusion of principles which were used interchangeably from one case to another.5
Courts seemed to look at the covenant itself, and the elements of time and space
,were examined to determine if the covenant was general or partial. If the restraint
imposed was unlimited in both time and space, the restraint was said to be general
and the contract was held invalid; if the restrain were partial, that is, limited in
both time and space, the contract was valid.6
The leading case of Mitchell v. Reynolds7 affirmed the necessity of determining whether or not the contract was general or partial, but went farther by
setting out that only if the contract were partial and nbt unreasonable8 would it
be valid. But in Horner v. Graves,9 the court disregarded the necessity of determining whether or not the restraint was general or partial, and challenged the
3. Standard Oil Company v. Bertelsen, 186 Minn. 483, 243 N. W. 701, 703 (1932).
4. Anonymous Case, Moore 115, 72 Eng. Rep. 477 (K. B. 1578); Diers Case, Y. B. 2
Hen 5, vol. 5, pl. 26 (D. B. 1415) ; Ipswich Tailors Case, Coke 54a, 77 Eng. Rep.
1218 (K. B. 1614).

5. Contracts ancillary to the lease of a bakeshop, Mitchell v. Reyonlds, I P. Wms. 181,
24 Eng. Rep. 347 (Ch. 1711) ; employment contract, Hitchcock v. Coker, 6 Adol. & E.
438, 112 Eng. Rep. 167 (K. B. 1837) ; ancillary to the sale of a business, Leather Cloth
Co. v. Lorosont, 32 L. J. Ch. 727, 9 Eq. Cas. 345 (Ch. 1869) ; employment contract,
Rousillon v. Rousillon, 14 Ch. Div. 351 (Ch. 1880) ; sale of patents and business,
.Nordenfelt v. Maxim Nordenfelt Guns and Ammunition Co., Ltd., A. C. 535 (H. L.
1894).

6. Broad v. Jollyffe, Cro. Jac. 596, 79 Eng. Rep. 509 (K. B. 1620) ; Rogers v. Parrey,
7.

2 Bulst. 136, 80 Eng. Rep. 1013 (K. B. 1613) ; Prugnell v. Gosse, Aleyn 67, 82 Eng.
Rep. 919 (K. B. 1648).
1 P. Wms. 181, 24 Eng. Rep. 347, 349 (Ch. 1711).

8. The test of reasonableness of the contract was a matter of public policy which involved several considerations: (a) Does the contract deprive the promissee of a
livelihood? (b) Does the contract deprive the public of the services of the party restrained? (c) Does the contract destroy or discourage industry or enterprise, diminish ingenuity and skill? (d) Discourage competition and increase prices? (6) Encourage monopolies? If these questions could, from the facts of the case, be answered
negatively, the contract was adjudged reasonable and valid.
9. 7 Bing. 744, 131 Eng. Rep. 284 (C. P. 1837).
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contract only on the basis of its reasonableness10 in relation to the interests the
employer was seeking to protect. The introduction of this rule of reasonableness
caused the English courts and those in America to fall into two distinct groups:
11
those which held with the doctrine of Mitchell v Reynolds, and those which
12
adopted the rule of Horner v. Graves.
In 1853 there was the first judicial recognition of a need, in the cases of
contracts of employment, to balance the interests of the parties to such contracts,
between two theories: Freedom of Contract, and Freedom of Trade and the
interest of the public in the use of men's talents.13 The attempt to balance the
interests of the parties resulted in the recognition of the principle that, since there
is more freedom of contract as between the buyer and seller of a business, or
parties to the dissolution of a partnership, on the one hand, than between an em14
ployer and an employee on the other, different considerations should apply.
Opinions of courts on this question are now uniform, and courts will be more
reluctant to uphold contracts between employer and employee than those ancillary
to the sale of a business or dissolution of a partnership. 15
The general rule at present is that the validity of contracts restraining an
employee from entering a competitive business after termination of employment
will depend upon the special circumstances shown which will make the contract
reasonable. 16 These special circumstances are: (1) That there must be trade
Reasonableness was determined by considering "whether the restraint imposed is
such as to afford only a fair protection to the interest of the party in favor of whom
it is given, and not so large as to interfere with the interest of the party in favor of
whom it is given, and not so large as to interfere with the interest of the public."
11. Ward v. Byrne, 5 M. & W. 548, 151 Eng. Rep. 232 (C. P. 1939) ; Hinde v. Gray, I
Man. & G. 195, 133 Eng. Rep. 302 (C. P. 1940) ; Alger v. Thatcher, 19 Pick. 51, 31
Am. Dec. 119; Keeler v. Taylor, 3 Smith 467, 53 Pa. Rep. 467, 91 Am. Rec. 452 (1866).
12. Tallis v. Tallis, I E. & B. 391, 118 Eng. Rep. 482 (K. B. 1853) ; Wallis v. Day, 2 M.
& W. 273, 150 Eng. Rep. 759 (Ex. Ch. 1837). Rousillon v. Rousillon, 14 Ch. Div. 351
Ch. 1880) ; Carter v. Ailing, 43 Fed. 208 (C. C. A. 2nd Cir. 1890) ; Diamond Match
v. Roeber, 106 N. Y. 473, 13 N. E. 419 (1887).
13. Tallis v. Tallis, 1 E. & B. 391, 118 Eng. Rep. 482 (K. B. 1853).
14. "Different considerations must apply in cases of apprenticeships and cases of that
sort, on the one hand, and cases of the sale of a business or dissolution of a partnership on the other," and again, "There is obviously more freedom of contract between
buyer and seller than between master and servant and a person seeking employment."
See Nordenfelt v. Maxim Nordenfelt Guns and Ammunition Co., Ltd., A. C. 535, 565
(H. L. 1894) ; Mason v. Provident Clothing and Supply Co., Ltd., A. C. 724, 738, 739
(H. L. 1913).
15. See Keeler v. Taylor, 3 Smith 467, 53 Pa. Rep. 467, 468-470, 91 Am. Dec. 452 (1866)
Milwaukee Linen Supply Co. v. Ring, 210 Wis. 467, 246 N. W. 567, 569 (1933)
Thomas W. Briggs Co. v. Mason, 217 Ky. 269, 289 S. W. 295, 297 (1926) ; that such
covenants are prima facie void, see Morris v. Saxelby, A. C. 688, 694 (H. L. 1916) ;
Mason v. Provident Clothing Supply Co., Ltd., A. C. 724, 735 (H. L. 1913) ; McCluer
v. Super Maid Cook-Ware, 62 F. (2d) 426 (C. C. A. 10th 1932) ; or are void by
statute, D. F. Burger Creamery Co. v. Deweerdt, 263 Mich. 366, 248 N. W. 839
(1933) ; Brown v. Williams, 166 Ga. 804, 144 S. E. 256 (1928). But cf. Eureka
Laundry v. Long, 146 Wis. 205, 131 N. W. 412 (1911).
16. Kadis v. Britt, 224 N. C. 154, 29 S. E. (2d) 543 (1944) ; See Roy v. Bolduc, 34 Atl.
(2d) 479, 480, 149 A. L. R. 630, 631 (Me. 1943) ; Clark Paper Co. v. Stenacher, 236
N. Y. 312, 140 N. E. 708, 710 (1923).
10.
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secrets in connection with the employer's business which require protection.
The existence of such trade secrets is primarily a matter of fact which must be
18
(2) That there must be
determined by the nature or character of the business.
as to require protection
so
employee
by
the
secrets
the
of
a real risk of disclosure
19
secrets must be shown.
to
the
employee
the
of
for the employer. The relation
relationship will selthe
secret,
the
of
aware
If the employee was only factually
must be so closely
employee
dom be sufficient to validate the contract, rather, the
that such secrets
employer
the
to
associated with the secrets that there is a real risk
20
This cannot
customers.
will be divulged or used for the purpose of deflecting
a matter
is
not
it
for
be shown by attacking the moral character of the employee,
the emwhich
of integrity or honor. Nor can it apply to the skill or knowledge
1
ployee has learned during the course of employment.2 (3) And, if the "above
conditions are met, courts will uniformly uphold the contract, if the restraint
imposed by the contract is no wider than will reasonably protect the employer
from possible misuse of the trade secrets or customer lists by 'the employee who has
22
learned them through his employment connection.
In considering the territorial restriction in the covenant, it appears, that in
order for such a limitation to be reasonable, it must be no more extensive than
the limits over which the employer's business extends, or by a reasonable allowance, may be extended. 23

Trade secrets are of two types: (a) Trade Secrets, that is, secret materials or processes used in the manufacture of the employers products, and price lists; and (b)
Customer Lists, both those to whom he sells his products and those from whom he
purchases materials to manufacture those products. See Thomas W. Briggs Co. v.
Mason, 217 Ky. 269, 289 S. W. 295, 297 (1926) ; Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452,
454 (1868) ; Carter v. Ailing, 43 Fed. 208, 213 (C. C. A. 2nd 1890) ; Kaddis v. Britt,
244 N. C. 154, 29 S. E. (2d) 543, 547 (1944).
18. See Sherman v. Pfefferkorn, 241 Mass. 468, 135 N. E. 568-571 (1908) ; Clark Paper
& Mfg. Co. v. Stenacher, 236 N. Y. 312, 140 N. E. 708, 710 (1923) ; Samuels Stores v.
Abrams, 94 Conn. 248, 108 At. 541, 543 (1919).
19. See Magnolia Metal Co. v. Price, 65 App. Div. 276, 72 N. Y. S. 792, 795 (1901)
May
Clark Paper & Mfg. Co. v. Stenacher, 236 N. Y. 312, 140 N. E. 708, 711 (1923)
v. Young, 125 Conn. 1, 2 Atl. (2d) 385, 388 (1938).
Fed20. See Thomas W. Briggs Co. v. Mason, 217 Ky. 269, 289 S. W. 295, 298 (1926)
eral Laundry Co. v. Zimmerman, 218 Wis. 211, 187 N. W. 335, 336 (1922) ; Carter
v. Ailing, 43 Fed. 208, 215 (C. C. A. 2nd 1890).
21. "An employer cannot prevent his employee from using the skill or knowledge in his
trade or profession which he has learned in the course of his employment by means
of directions or instructions from the employer." Sir W. C. Leng & Co. v. Andrews, 1
Ch. 763, 774 (Ch. 1909) ; See Morris v. Saxelby, A. C. 688, 709 (H. L. 1916) ; Clark
Paper & Mfg. Co. v. Stenacher, 236 N. Y. 312, 140 N. E. 708, 711 (1923).
22. Cali v. National Linen Service Corp. 38 F. (2d) 35 (C. C. A. 5th 1930) ; Racine v.
Bender, 141 Wash. 606, 252 Pac. 115 (1926) ; Moskin Bros. v. Swartzberg, 199 N. C.
539, 155 S. E. 154 (1930) ; that the restriction must not impose undue hardship upon
the employee, see, Samuels Stores v. Abrams, 94 Conn. 248, 108 Atl. 541, 544 (1919) ;
MilThomas W. Briggs Co. v. Mason, 217 Ky. 269, 289 S. W. 295, 297, 298 (1926)
waukee Linen Supply Co. v. Ring, 210 Wis. 467, 246 N. W. 567, 569 (1933); that
due regard must be had for the public interest, see Sternberg v. O'Brien, 48 N. J.
Eq. 370, 22 At. 348, 349 (1891) ; Cropper v. Davis, 243 Fed. 310, 313 (C. C. A. 9th
1917) ; professional contract, see Granger v. Craven, 159 Minn. 296, 199 N. W. 10
(1910). "A restraint that is unreasonable as to defendant is prejudicial to the public,
and is therefore, unenforceable." Morris v. Saxelby, A. C. 688, 738 (H. L. 1916).
23. Any place its business was carried on was held unreasonable, Whiting Milk Co. v.
O'Connel, 277 Mass. 468, 179 N. E. 169 (1931) ; within the cities of Wyemouth, Hingham and Braintree held invalid as to employee, Sherman v. Pfefferkorn, 241 Mass.
468, 135 N. E. 568 (1908) ; within the city held reasonable, Dow v. Gotch, 113 Neb.
60, 201 N. W. 655 (1924).

17.
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NOTES

Courts are not in accord as to what may constitute a reasonable length of
time for the operation of the negative covenant, but it is generally agreed, that
the time restriction cannot be for a greater length of time than is actually needed
for the protection of the employers interest. 24

The above discussion probably indicates factors the Wyoming Court had in
mind when it intimated it would enforce such a contract in a proper case of
"justice and necessity". The element of "necessity" is probably to be found in the
existence of trade secrets, and "justice" in the reasonableness of the contract to
protect such trade secrets, without going further with the evident purpose of

preventing the employee from terminating the contract.
FREDERICK E. BURDETr.

24-.

For five years held unreasonable,
Schatcher, 125 Misc. 805, 212 N. Y.
Young, 125 Conn. 1, 2 A. (2d) 385
dry, Inc. v. Walker, 171 Md. 7, 187

New York Linen Supply and Laundry Co. v.
S. 72 (1925) ; two years held reasonable, May v.
(1938) ; one year held reasonable, Tolman LaunAt. 836 (1936).

